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Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke: Preemption of State Law With
Respect to National Bank Operating Subsidiaries
I. INTRODUCTION
With its roots grounded in the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution, the preemption doctrine has been used by national
banks for over 140 years to avoid following dozens of distinct sets of
state banking regulations.' Currently, however, there is a growing
national debate over the scope of preemption and the extent to which
national banks are authorized to preempt state laws.
2
One area in particular where this debate is emerging is that of
national bank operating subsidiaries. Are national banks operating
subsidiaries, like their national bank parents, exempt from following
state regulations as a result of preemption?
3  This was precisely the
question presented to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
in Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke.4 The Burke court concluded that
federal law does preempt state law with respect to national bank
operating subsidiaries to the same extent as it does with respect to the
national bank parents!
The Second Circuit was the first federal circuit court to rule on
the issue, establishing a precedent favorable to national banks.
6 In
making its decision, the Second Circuit in Burke deferred to a regulation
promulgated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
that defines the scope of operating subsidiaries' preemption
1. See 12 U.S.C. § 484 (2000) (indicating that the National Bank Act of 1864 created
nationally chartered banks).
2. See infra notes 48-173 and accompanying text.
3. National bank operating subsidiaries are in effect incorporated departments of the
bank. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34 (2005).
4. See Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305 (2d Cir.2005).
5. See id.
6. Richard Cowden, Second Circuit Upholds Authority of OCC to Preempt States
Regarding National Banks, 85 BANKING REP. 3, 129 (2005) (explaining that the Burke court
was the first federal circuit decision on the issue of preemption with respect to operating
subsidiaries).
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capabilities.7 The timing of this decision was crucial for national
banks.8 The debate over the extent to which the OCC can promulgate
preempting regulations is current, and Burke stands as support for a
recent movement by the OCC to expand its regulatory authority. 9
Nonetheless, the regulation relied on in Burke, along with the OCC's
banking preemption policy in general, has remained the center of
significant controversy.' 0
In analyzing Burke, Part II of this Note details the legislative
history of national banks and the general analysis utilized by courts for
preemption challenges." Part III presents the facts of Burke, details the
procedural posture of this case, and evaluates the Second Circuit's
application of the law to these facts.' 2 Part IV forecasts the effects the
Burke decision will have on the battle over preemption as well as
banking law as a whole.' 3 Additionally, Part IV inquires into the Burke
Court's rationale and suggests that Burke was decided incorrectly based
upon its unwarranted deference to the OCC.' 4
II. NATIONAL BANKS AND PREEMPTION
A. History of National Banks
Congress enacted the National Bank Act of 1864 (NBA) to
establish a federal banking system and to help stabilize the economy by
providing a uniform national currency.' 5 Prior to the NBA, all 1466
banks in the United States were state-chartered institutions regulated by
the laws of each individual state.' 6 Through the NBA, Congress granted
7. The central preemption regulation at issue in Burke was 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006. See
Burke, 414 F.3d at 319.
8. See generally Martin Flumenbaum & Brad Karp, Preemption of State Banking
Laws, 234 N.Y. L. J. (July 27, 2005) (describing the effect and aftermath of Burke).
9. See infra notes 96-117 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 118-73 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 15-47 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 48-95 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 96-117 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 118-73 and accompanying text.
15. See Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 68 Fed.
Reg. 46,119, 46,120 (proposed Aug. 5, 2003) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 734)
[hereinafter "Bank Activities"] (describing the legislative history of the National Bank Act).
16. Mark Furletti, The Debate Over the National Bank Act and the Preemption of State
Efforts to Regulate Credit Cards, 77 TEMP. L. REv. 425, 427 (2004).
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nationally chartered banks "all such incidental powers as shall be
necessary to carry on the business of banking."'
7 Congress intended for
national banks to operate distinctly and separately from state banks, and
likewise did not intend for national banks to be governed by state law.'
8
Congress was concerned that subjecting national banks to individual
state laws would impede the objectives of national banks through
unfriendly legislation and harmful competition.'
9
The NBA also created the OCC to supervise and regulate
national banks within the Department of Treasury.
0  Congress
authorized the OCC "to make a thorough examination of all the affairs
of [national banks],"2 ' and reinforced the OCC's supervisory authority
by granting the agency exclusive visitorial powers over national banks,
except where federal law provided otherwise.
22
B. The OCC and Operating Subsidiaries
The OCC has had a significant impact on the development of
operating subsidiaries as well as the extent to which they may preempt
state laws.23 The OCC promulgated 12 C.F.R. § 5.34 in 1983, which
determined that, in accordance with national banks' incidental powers, a
"national bank may conduct in an operating subsidiary activities that are
permissible for a national bank to engage in directly whether as part of,
or incidental to, the business of banking.
24  Additionally, the OCC
clarified the preemption capabilities of operating subsidiaries when it
specified that "operating subsidiar[ies] conduct activities [related to
licensing and examination procedures] pursuant to the same
17. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (2000).
18. See Bank Activities, supra note 15, at 46,120.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. 12 U.S.C. § 481 (2000).
22. 12 U.S.C. § 484 (2000); see also Bank Activities, supra note 15, at 46,120; see also
NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256 (1995)
(explaining how the Comptroller of the Currency has the authority to set forth the rules and
regulations for national banks, and how the OCC's rulemaking authority includes the
authorization to define the "incidental powers" of national banks in addition to the ones
listed in the NBA).
23. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(1) (2005).
24. Id.
2006]
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authorization, terms and conditions that apply to the conduct of such
activities by its national parent bank." 5
In reinforcing this point, the OCC issued 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 in
2001, which proclaimed: "Unless otherwise provided by Federal law or
OCC regulation, State laws apply to national bank operating
subsidiaries to the same extent that those laws apply to the parent
national bank. '2 6  While this regulation does not speak directly to a
specific preemption issue, it implies that state law should be preempted
for national bank operating subsidiaries to the same extent as they are
preempted for the parent national banks.27 One of the controversial
issues raised in Burke is whether the OCC had the authority to issue this
regulation, and therefore whether the Second Circuit should have given
the regulation deference. 28 This issue is addressed in greater detail in a
following section of this Note.29
C. Preemption Analysis
Preemption of state law occurs in three different situations.30
One, preemption can occur when a federal statute explicitly
demonstrates a congressional intent for preemption.3 Preemption may
also arise when a particular statute's "structure and purpose" reveal an
implicit intent by Congress to preempt state law.32 Lastly, and
applicable to the facts in Burke, preemption can occur where federal law
is in "irreconcilable conflict" with state law.33
According to the United States Supreme Court, an
"irreconcilable conflict" exists where "compliance with both federal and
25. Id. at § 5.34(e)(3).
26. Id. at § 7.4006.
27. See id.
28. Press Release, Conference of State Bank Supervisors, Statement by Neil Milner
(Feb. 12, 2004), available at http://csbs.org/pr/news releases/2004/nr 02.13.04.htm ("OCC
has acted unilaterally and with disregard for repeated requests from the Congress to allow
federal lawmakers time to debate and deliberate on the issues.") [hereinafter CSBS Feb. 12,
2004 Press Release].
29. See infra notes 127-58 and accompanying text.
30. See Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996) (explaining
the circumstances under which preemption of state law may occur).
31. See id. (ruling that a federal statute was in direct conflict with a state statute, and as





state regulations is a physical impossibility, or when state law stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress. 34 The Court has also noted that "federal
regulations have no less preemptive effect than federal statutes,,
35 and
the Fifth Circuit has determined that the OCC may enact regulations
that preempt state law.36
When addressing a challenge to the preemption of a particular
law, courts begin by examining Congress's intent with respect to the
preempting statute itself, or the statute that authorized an agency's
issuance of preempting regulations.37 The U.S. Supreme Court has
determined that "the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone of
pre-emption analysis. 38  Further, there is an "assumption that the
historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by ... [a]
Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress. 39
However, in order to show congressional intent when
determining the preemptive effect of a regulation, it is not necessary to
demonstrate an express congressional authorization to preempt state
law.n° Instead, the analysis centers on whether a particular agency in
question acted within the authority granted to it by statute when
enacting the regulation.4'
In analyzing the preempting effect of agency regulations, courts
often apply the framework set forth in the 1984 Supreme Court case
34. Fidelity Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)
(determining that federal law preempted state law and applied to federal savings and loan's
"due-on-scale" practices).
35. Id. at 153.
36. Wells Fargo Bank of Tex., N.A. v. James, 321 F.3d 488, 494 (5th Cir. 2003)
(holding that in promulgating 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002, the OCC operated within the sphere
delegated it by Congress when issuing the regulation that preempted state law).
37. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 152 (holding that federal law preempted state law with
respect to federal savings and loan's "due-on-scale" practices).
38. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (analyzing the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution and its allowance of preemption of state laws); see also
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485-486 (1996) ("Any understanding of the scope of
a pre-empting statute must rest primarily on a fair understanding of congressional purpose.")
(quoting from Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 530 n.27).
39. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (quoting from Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947)).
40. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 154.
41. Id.
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Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.42  The
Chevron doctrine consists of two parts: (1) whether Congress's intent in
the statute is "clear as to the precise question at issue; '43 and, if not, (2)
whether the agency's action is "based on a permissible construction of
the statute."" In the event that a statute is silent or ambiguous in
regards to the question presented, it is then necessary to proceed to step
two in the Chevron analysis.45 Step two involves an inquiry into
whether the issuance of the particular regulation at hand was reasonable
within the agency's statutory authority.46 With specific relevance to the
situation in Burke, it is important to note that the Supreme Court has
said: "We must give great weight to any reasonable construction" by the
OCC of a statute when there is an ambiguity in the statute's
interpretation. 7
III. WACHOVIA BANK, N.A. v. BURKE
A. Facts
Wachovia Bank is a nationally chartered bank.48 Wachovia
Mortgage is a North Carolina corporation that became a wholly owned
operating subsidiary of Wachovia Bank in 2003.49 Wachovia Mortgage
has an office in Connecticut, and after becoming wholly owned by
Wachovia Bank, it gave up its Connecticut mortgage licenses while
42. 468 U.S. 1227 (1984); see also NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life
Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 257-258 (1995) (applying the Chevron doctrine and upholding
Comptroller of Currency's broad decision-making power); see also Wells Fargo Bank of
Tex., N.A. v. James, 321 F.3d 488, 494 (2003) (applying the Chevron doctrine and holding
that in promulgating 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002, the OCC operated within the sphere delegated it by
Congress).
43. NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 257
(1995) (quoting from Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467
U.S. 837, 842 (1984)).
44. Id. (quoting from Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 403 (1987) (ruling for the OCC giving it
broad discretion to interpret whether certain discount brokerage services were subject to
restrictions) (quoting from Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
48. Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 310 (2d Cir. 2005).
49. Id.
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continuing to act as a mortgage lender." As a result, Connecticut's
Banking Commissioner (Commissioner) filed a Notice of Intent to Issue
a Cease and Desist Order against Wachovia Mortgage for operating as a
mortgage lender in Connecticut without a Connecticut license.
5
Wachovia Mortgage decided to apply for re-licensing, but reserved its
right for further legal action.52  Wachovia Bank subsequently filed a
lawsuit in the United States District Court of Connecticut, requesting a
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Commissioner
based on the assertion that the applicable federal OCC regulations
preempt Connecticut law.53
B. District Court
The district court held that the applicable Connecticut banking
regulations conflicted with federal law, triggering the preemption of
Connecticut law by the OCC regulations.5 4 The district court utilized
the Chevron doctrine and, after finding that Congress had not directly
addressed this question in the statute, decided that the OCC's regulation
section 7.4006, "was a reasonable regulation designed to prevent state
laws from inhibiting a national bank's ability to conduct banking
through a subsidiary, as authorized under 12 U.S.C. § 24.""
5 The
Commissioner appealed to the Second Circuit following the district
court's issuance of a declaratory judgment for Wachovia Mortgage on




53. Id. (indicating that there were six Connecticut regulations at issue in this case;
Wachovia Mortgage also brought claims for abridgment of rights provided by federal law
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Court ruled that § 1983 did not provide any federally
protected rights in this case).
54. Burke, 414 F. 3d at 310 (indicating that the District Court also found that
Connecticut also abridged Wachovia Mortgage's rights provided by § 1983, but this part of
the decision was reversed by the Second Circuit).
55. See id (explaining that 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 determines that national bank operating
subsidiaries are subject to the same laws as their parent banks: "Unless otherwise provided
by Federal law or OCC Regulation, State laws apply to national bank operating subsidiaries
to the same extent that those laws apply to the parent national bank.").
56. See id.
2006]
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C. Second Circuit
The Second Circuit was the first United States Court of Appeals
to rule on this precise preemption issue regarding national bank
operating subsidiaries. 7 The Second Circuit affirmed the district
court's ruling and upheld its decision to grant a declaratory judgment in
favor of Wachovia Mortgage on the issue of preemption. 8 The court's
approach in resolving the issue involved an application of the Chevron
doctrine to the facts, which ultimately resulted in an inquiry into the
reasonableness of the OCC regulations at issue.59
1. Step One: Has Congress Directly Addressed the Question at Issue?
The court framed its analysis of this question as a response to
two of the Commissioner's primary contentions. 60 The statute at issue
was the NBA, which does not expressly mention "national bank
operating subsidiaries.",6' The Commissioner, however, argued that it is
clear through the NBA that Congress did not intend to grant such
entities the same preemption capabilities that it granted to their national
bank parents.62
First, the Commissioner argued that because the NBA did not
mention operating subsidiaries when explaining that "no national bank
shall be subject to any visitorial powers except as authorized by Federal
law, 6 3 it intended not to provide preemption of state laws for operating
subsidiaries. 64 In a brief of amicus curiae submitted to the Second
Circuit on behalf of Commissioner Burke, William Brauch, Iowa's
assistant attorney general, urged that because they were omitted from
the statute, "operating subsidiaries are not entitled to any immunity
57. See Cowden, supra note 6, at 129.
58. See Burke, 414 F. 3d at 320.
59. See id. at 318 (demonstrating how the court looked at the reasonableness of the
regulations because it determined that Congress had never addressed the precise question at
issue).
60. See infra notes 64, 69 and accompanying text.
61. See 12 U.S.C. § 484 (2000); see also Burke, 414 F.3d at 315-316.
62. See Burke, 414 F. 3dat 315.
63. 12 U.S.C. § 484 (2000).
64. See Burke, 414 F. 3dat315-316.
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from state supervision that 'national banks' may enjoy under Section
484(a).
65
The court rejected this first argument by explaining that the
OCC agrees with the Commissioner in that the OCC is not alleging that
the term "national bank" in § 484 includes operating subsidiaries.
66 The
court emphasized that the OCC argued only that the ability to conduct
business through operating subsidiaries falls within the "incidental
powers" granted to national banks by 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh).
67 The
court added that, moreover, "[t]o the extent that using an operating
subsidiary is a legitimate power granted to national banks, [the NBA]
provides the OCC with ample authority to preempt states from
exercising visitorial power over the subsidiary because such state
regulation could interfere with the national bank's exercise of its federal
,,68powers.
Second, the Commissioner argued that neither the OCC nor the
federal government had exclusive authority over operating subsidiaries
because such operating subsidiaries are merely national bank
"affiliates., 69 This is significant, the Commissioner argued, because the
Banking Act of 1933, parts of which are also known as the "Glass-
Steagall Act," granted the OCC only non-exclusive power with regard
to national bank "affiliates.,
70
The court responded by explaining that Congress enacted the
"Glass-Steagall Act" to address the "inherent conflict between the
promotional role of an investment banker and the commercial banker's
obligation to give disinterested investment advice."'" Therefore, the
65. Brief for Iowa Assistant Attorney General as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner-
Appellant at 14, Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2005) (No. 
04-
3770).
66. See Burke, 414 F. 3dat316.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 316; see also Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 
31
(1996) (ruling that a federal statute was in direct conflict with a state statute, and as a result,
the affiliated national bank was not prohibited from selling insurance).
69. See Burke, 414 F. 3d at 316-318 (explaining that 12 U.S.C. § 221(a) indicates 
an
intent not to grant exclusive power to the federal government in regards to national 
bank
"affiliates," and that the Banking Act of 1933, defined national bank "affiliates" as "any
corporation, business, trust, association, or similar organization [controlled by 
a] member
bank").
70. See id. at 316 (citing Banking Act of 1933, ch. 889, § 2(b), 48 Stat. 162, 
162
(current version at 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2000))).
71. Id. at 316 (citing Sec. Indus. Ass'n v. Bd. of Gov'rs of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
716
F.2d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 1983)).
2006]
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
court concluded that the "Glass-Steagall Act" does not address the
question at issue. 72 Additionally, the court noted that while the "Glass-
Steagall Act" was enacted in 1933, the OCC did not begin to identify
national banks' use of operating subsidiaries until the 1960s.73
Likewise, the court continued, Congress distinguished operating
subsidiaries in 1999 by enacting the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA),
which allowed national banks to operate "financial subsidiaries. 74
By rejecting these two arguments, the Court determined that
step one of the Chevron analysis was not satisfied because Congress had
not spoken to the precise issue at hand.75 Therefore, it was necessary to
address the second prong of the Chevron framework in order to
determine Congressional intent.76
2. Step Two: Is 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 Reasonable?
The central preemption regulation at issue in Burke was 12
C.F.R. § 7.4006. 77 Section 7.4006 reads: "Unless otherwise provided by
Federal law or OCC regulation, State laws apply to national bank
operating subsidiaries to the same extent that those laws apply to the
parent national bank. 78 The Commissioner in Burke contended that the
court should not have relied on the regulation for two primary reasons.79
The Commissioner argued that (1) the rationale of section 7.4006 is
72. Id. at 318 ("The 'Glass-Steagall Act' targeted national banks' use of affiliates toengage in non-commercial banking and does not address national banks' use of operating
subsidiaries to engage in the business of banking.").
73. Id. at 317 (citing Acquisition of Controlling Stock Interest in Subsidiary Operations
Corporation, 31 Fed. Reg. 11,441, 11,459 (Aug. 31, 1966)).
74. See id. at 317 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 24a (2000)) ("[The GLBA] excluded from thedefinition of 'financial subsidiary' a subsidiary 'that engages solely in activities that nationalbanks are permitted to engage in directly and are conducted subject to the same terms andconditions that govern the conduct of such activities by such national banks.").
75. Burke, 414 F. 3d at 318.
76. See id. (referencing NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.,513 U.S. 251, 257-258 (1995) (determining that the Chevron doctrine applied and thereforethe Comptroller of Currency's broad decision-making power and interpretations must be
upheld)).
77. Id. at319.
78. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 (2005) (demonstrating that this regulation was enacted in 2001
by the OCC).
79. Burke, 414 F. 3d at 318-19.
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unreasonable; and (2) section 7.4006 simply reflects the OCC's opinion
of what a court would hold.8°
First, the Commissioner asserted that the rationale behind
section 7.4006 is flawed because, by suggesting that operating
subsidiaries are "in essence incorporated departments" of parent
banks,8  the regulation "unreasonably disregards the corporate
separateness of a parent bank and improperly allows national banks to
take advantage of the legal benefits through a subsidiary while
remaining free from state regulation.
82
In response, the court highlighted the extensive history of
national banks' use of subsidiaries as "convenient and useful corporate
form[s] of conducting [banking] activities.,
83  The court seemed to
endorse this type of use by quoting the following line from the Federal
Register: "The use of a separate subsidiary structure can enhance the
safety and soundness of conducting new activities from those of the
parent bank and allowing more focused management and monitoring 
of
operations., 84  By citing the Federal Register as support, the Court
appeared to essentially be punting to the OCC, granting the agency
broad discretion in its policy judgments.
The Commissioner's other argument regarding the second prong
of the Chevron analysis attempted to discredit some of the authority
submitted by Wachovia.86 Wachovia, in support of preemption, cited 66
Fed. Reg. 33,790, which includes the OCC's 
view of section 7.4006.87
The Commissioner asserted that the Court could not base its decision on
the OCC's opinion of how it believed a court would rule on the issue.
88
80. Id.
81. Id. at 318 (referencing 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006).
82. Id. (explaining that the operating subsidiaries are not "in essence" incorporated
departments of the bank contrary to the rationale and wording of § 7.4006).
83. Id. at 319 (citing 66 Fed. Reg. 34,784, 34,788 (July 2, 2001)).
84. Id. (citing Rules, Policies and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 
Fed. Reg.
60,342, 60,354 (Nov. 27, 1996)).
85. See Burke, 414 F. 3dat319.
86. Id. ("The commissioner... argu[es] that 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 merely reflects 
the
OCC's view of what courts would hold.").
87. See id. at 310 (referencing 66 Fed. Reg. at 33,790 ("Section 7.4006 
generally
provides that national bank operating subsidiaries are subject to State law to the extent 
State
law applies to their parent bank. The section itself does not effect preemption 
of State law;
it reflects the conclusion we believe a federal court would reach, even in the 
absence of the
regulation, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause and applicable Federal judicial 
precedent.")).
88. See id., at 319-20.
2006]
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The Court again sided with Wachovia, citing a recent example
where a Georgia statute was preempted by federal law based on an
opinion submitted by the OCC. 9 However, the court added a backup
rationale by suggesting that the authority provided by 12 C.F.R. §
7.4006 was not determinative in this case because 12 C.F.R. §§ 34. 1(b)
and 34.4 also support a finding for preemption.90 This suggestion is
dubious, however, because the court's discussion throughout the
opinion is dominated by the validity of 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006. 91 Moreover,
the Commissioner's appeal was focused solely on the premise that the
district court should not have deferred to section 7.4006.92 Therefore,
despite the court's "last-minute safety-hatch" contention otherwise, the
central preemption regulation at issue in Burke was 12 C.F.R. §
7.4006. 93
Overall, the court held that (1) Congress had not addressed, in
the NBA, the specific issue of whether preemption of state law applies
to bank operating subsidiaries, and (2) 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006, determining
that federal law preempts state law with regard to operating subsidiaries,
was a reasonable construction of the authorizing statute.94 As a result,
the court in Burke ruled in favor of Wachovia on the issue of
preemption.95
89. See id. (citing Bank Activities, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904 (Jan. 13, 2004), in reference tothe Georgia Fair Lending Act (GFLA), which was preempted by state law in accordancewith an opinion issued by the OCC detailing the negative effects GFLA had on nationalbanks ("When national banks are unable to operate under uniform, consistent, andpredictable standards, their business suffers, which negatively affects their safety andsoundness ... The OCC is issuing this final rule in furtherance of its responsibility to enablenational banks to operate to the full extent of their powers under Federal law, withoutinterference from inconsistent state laws, ... and in furtherance of their safe and sound
operations.")).
90. See id. at 321 ("Even if [§ 7.4006 cannot be used as conclusive support], 12 C.F.R.§§ 34. 1(b) and 34.4 independently support a finding of preemption in this case.").
91. See Burke, 414 F. 3d at 318-21.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 321.
94. Seeid.at318-21.
95. Id. at 324.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF BURKE
A. Impact
The Burke decision had an immediate effect based on both the
timing of the decision and the fact that it was the first federal circuit
decision on the issue.96 On August 12, 2005, just over a month after the
Second Circuit issued its Burke opinion in favor of national banks, the
Ninth Circuit followed suit in Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Boutris, citing
Burke as support.97
Boutris involved a situation similar to Burke where California's
Banking Commissioner sought to enforce certain state regulations
against Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. (WFHMI), a wholly owned
operating subsidiary of Wells Fargo Bank.
98 The Commissioner in
Boutris argued that the OCC did not have the authority to promulgate
regulations such as section 7.4006 that in effect preempt state law.
99 In
rejecting the Commissioner's claims on this issue, the Ninth Circuit
pointed to Burke for authority, ultimately concluding that "the Bank Act
and OCC regulations preempt state banking laws concerning
subsidiaries of nationally chartered banks to the same extent that they
preempt regulation of the parent national bank."'
' However, the extent
to which Burke affected Boutris is debatable.'
0° Burke came after the
district court decision in Boutris where the U.S. District Court for 
the
Eastern District of California also decided for preemption, and the Ninth
Circuit merely upheld the district 
court. 0 2
96. See Cowden, supra note 6, at 129 (explaining that the Burke court 
was the first
federal circuit court to rule on the issue of preemption with respect 
to operating
subsidiaries).
97. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Boutris, 419 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2005) (upholding 
the
district court's ruling that the Commissioner could not enforce CRMLA or 
the CFLL
against WFHMI because federal regulations preempt state regulations 
with respect to
national bank operating subsidiaries); see also Ethan Zindler, in Brief: 
Court Upholds
Preemption for Bank Units, AM. BANKER ONLINE, Aug. 15, 2005 ("The U.S. 
Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in San Francisco upheld a lower court's ruling that 
California
regulators' attempt to require a Wells Fargo & Co. subsidiary to hold a state license 
to offer
mortgages was not legal.").
98. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Boutris, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1164 
(E.D. Cal.
2003) (explaining the background of the circumstances in the case).
99. See Boutris, 419 F. 3d at 957.
100. See id. at 963 n.15 (citing Burke, 414 F.3d at 305); see also Zindler, supra 
note 97.
101. See infra note 102.
102. See Boutris, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 1164; see also Boutris, 419 F.3d 949, 954 
(affirming
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Nonetheless, after Boutris, there were two federal circuits which
had ruled on the issue in favor of national banks, further strengthening
the precedent set by Burke.10 3 This fact had a significant effect on the
recent Michigan preemption case Wachovia Mortgage v. Watters.10 4
The facts and issues presented in Watters resemble those found in Burke
and Boutris.'°5 In Watters, the Michigan Commissioner of Insurance
and Financial Services attempted to suspend Wachovia Mortgage, a
national bank operating subsidiary, from conducting mortgage lending
activities in Michigan after the subsidiary relinquished its state lending
registration. 0 6  In August of 2004, the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Michigan concluded, "OCC regulations prohibiting
states from exercising visitorial authority over the operating subsidiaries
of national banks represent a permissible construction of the National
Banking Act."' 7 Therefore, the court continued, federal law preempts
state law with respect to operating subsidiaries to the same extent it
does with respect to the national parent banks.' 08
On appeal, in December of 2005, the Sixth Circuit upheld the
district court's decision in Watters.'09 In support of preemption, the
Sixth Circuit cited Wachovia v. Burke and the Second Circuit's
treatment of section 7.4006.' "°
Another related case was recently decided in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York involving a dispute
between New York attorney general Eliot Spitzer and the OCC."1 The
OCC brought the case seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive
relief in order to bar Spitzer from "infringing on the OCC's exclusive
visitorial authority over national banks and their operating
subsidiaries."' 12 The OCC pointed to Burke for support and prevailed,
district court).
103. SeeBoutris, 419 F.3d at 954.
104. See 334 F. Supp. 2d 957 (W.D. Mich. 2004).
105. See infra notes 106-108; see also Boutris, 419 F.3d 949; Burke, 414 F.3d 305.
106. See Federal District Court Upholds OCC Authority to Exercise Visitorial AuthorityOver Operating Subsidiaries, 8 FiN. SERVICES ALERT 2 (Aug. 31, 2004) (summarizing the
district court ruling in Watters).
107. Id.
108. See id
109. See Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Watters, 431 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 2005).
110. Id.
111. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d 383 (2005).
112. Id. at 383.
gaining permanent injunctive relief from the Office of the Attorney
General for New York.
1 13
Overall, the Burke decision came at a great time for national
banks.1 14 It stands as support for the OCC in an ongoing 
movement to
expand federal preemption of state banking law.
115 Due to the fact that
it was the first of a series of current cases related to preemption, 
Burke
has the potential to create a domino effect of decisions that 
could build a
considerable amount of judicial precedent that will be 
difficult to
overcome. 116 One commentator noted, "[T]he timing of 
the Wachovia
decision was serendipitous [for the national banks]."
1 7
B. Criticisms of Burke
Because the Burke opinion was the first instance in which 
a U.S.
Court of Appeals ruled on the issue of preemption of state 
regulations
by a national bank's operating subsidiary,
118 the only precedent that the
Second Circuit had to go by was a series of district court 
cases that all
ruled in favor of preemption for operating subsidiaries.
1 9 One such
district court case was Wells Fargo Bank v. Boutris, as discussed above,
where the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California 
used
reasoning similar to that of the Burke court.
20  The court in Boutris
ruled that the Commissioner had no visitorial powers 
over the
subsidiary because the OCC had authority to enact 12 C.F.R. 
§ 7.4006,
which limited the application of state law to subsidiaries 
of national
banks, and because the OCC's visitorial powers were exclusive.
21 Like
113. Id. at 404, 407.
114. See generally Martin Flumenbaum & Brad Karp, 
Preemption of State Banking
Laws, 234 N.Y. L.J. (2005) (describing the effect and aftermath 
of Burke).
115. See generally id. (explaining the relevance of Burke).
116. See Cowden, supra note 6, at 129 (explaining that 
the Burke court was the first
federal circuit decision on the issue of preemption with respect 
to operating subsidiaries).
117. See Flumenbaum & Karp, supra note 114.
118. See Cowden, supra note 6, at 129 (explaining 
that the Burke court was the first
federal circuit court to rule on the issue of preemption with 
respect to operating
subsidiaries).
119. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Boutris, 265 F. 
Supp. 2d 1162, 1164 (E.D. Cal.
2003).
120. See id. at 1164 (explaining the background of the circumstances 
in the case).
121. See id. at 1169-70 (ruling that the Commissioner could 
not enforce CRMLA or the
CFLL against WFHMI because federal regulations preempt state 
regulations with respect to
national bank operating subsidiaries).
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Burke, Boutris gave deference to the OCC's interpretative regulation122
that the banks used in persuading the courts that federal regulations
preempt state law even when dealing with operating subsidiaries.123
1. The Pre-Existing Controversy
The question of whether the OCC is authorized to adopt
expansive preemption regulations like 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 is the subject
of significant controversy. 24 Consequently, many who disagree with
the OCC's stance on preemption assert that the Second Circuit should
not have deferred to section 7.4006 in upholding preemption for
operating subsidiaries. 25
In response to an announcement made by the Comptroller of the
Currency in early 2004 regarding OCC preemption regulations, the
Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) issued this statement:
The [CSBS] is stunned that the [OCC] would proceed
with implementation of this far-reaching preemption
proposal in the face of widespread opposition from
members of Congress, state banking and financial
regulators .... The arrogance and audacity of the
Comptroller's actions are astounding. Ignoring
concerns from the United States Congress, the nation's
governors, state legislatures, and attorneys general is an
affront to the democratic process. 26
122. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 (2005) ("Unless otherwise provided by Federal law or OCCregulation, State laws apply to national bank operating subsidiaries to the same extent that
those laws apply to the parent national bank.").
123. Both Burke and Boutris cited 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 in their opinions, and deferred to itas the authoritative law on the issue. See Boutris, 419 F. 3d 949; Burke, 414 F. 3d 305.
124. See infra notes 125-58 and accompanying text.
125. See Arthur Wilmarth, The OCC's Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency's Authorityand Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23
ANN. REv. BANKrNG & FN. L. 225, 343-348 (2004).
126. See Press Release, Conference of State Bank Supervisors, CSBS Statement on theComptroller of the Currency's Preemption Announcement (Jan. 8 2004), available athttp://csbs.org/pr/newsreleases/2004/nr_01.08.04.htm ) [hereinafter CSBS Jan. 8, 2004
Press Release].
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2. Why Has Burke Been Criticized?
Three of the major arguments asserting that the Second Circuit
should not have deferred to the OCC in Burke involve the decision's (1)
effect on states' abilities to protect their citizens, (2) unconstitutional
allowance of the federal government's infringement on states' police
powers, and (3) misapplication of the preemption analysis.
27
A. PROTECTION OF CITIZENS
According to some commentators, by fundamentally expanding
the scope of preemption, the "OCC [is usurping] the states' ability to
protect their citizenry."' 28 The argument is that the OCC is taking away
the states' abilities to protect their citizens due to the fact that the OCC
preemption regulations allow entities such as operating subsidiaries to
ignore state consumer protection laws.1 29 Arthur Wilmarth, an advocate
for the CSBS, argues that state officials have been the "leaders in
combating fraud and other misconduct" in the banking industry, and
"the OCC's record in protecting consumers is not impressive."'
30  In
2000, for instance, Minnesota attorney general Mike Hatch sued an
operating subsidiary of Fleet Bank for privacy violations resulting from
a scheme where the subsidiary sold confidential customer information
to telemarketers. 3 ' The OCC, however, did not take enforcement
measures against Fleet, but instead filed a brief in support of dismissing
the lawsuit. 132  Fleet's attempt to dismiss the lawsuit was not
successful. 
33
127. See Wilmarth, supra note 125; see also CSBS January 8, 2004 Press Release, supra
note 126; see also Press Release, Conference of State Bank Supervisors, CSBS Statement
on U.S. District Court Ruling in Wachovia Bank v. Burke (May 28, 2004), available at
http://csbs.org/pr/news-releases/2004/nr_05.28.04.htm [hereinafter CSBS May 28, 2004
Press Release].
128. See CSBS Jan. 8, 2004 Press Release, supra note 126.
129. See Press Release, Conference of State Bank Supervisors, Attorneys General
Support Connecticut Appeal of Preemption Case (Oct. 14, 2004 ), available at
http://csbs.org/pr/news releases/
2 00 4/nr_10.14.04.htm [hereinafter CSBS Oct. 14, 2004
Press Release] ("Wachovia sought a determination that it can offer first and second
mortgages through its wholly-owned subsidiary, a state corporation, free from any state
oversight and without complying with state consumer protection laws.").
130. Wilmarth, supra note 125, at 348, 353.
131. Minnesota v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 158 F. Supp. 2d 962, 964 (D. Minn. 2001).
132. See Wilmarth, supra note 125, at 353.
133. See id. at 355.
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The list of unimpressive OCC protection of state citizens goes
on. Since June of 2000, the OCC has taken action on the grounds of
abusive or predatory lending practices against only seven national
banks.1 4  Furthermore, the OCC has brought only two public
enforcement actions for violations of customer privacy rules since
1999.' 35
Many commentators, including Congress, have questioned
whether the OCC has the "administrative resources [sufficient] to
enforce consumer protection laws against national banks and their
operating subsidiaries.' 36  The House Financial Services Committee
questioned whether the OCC has the necessary resources to "investigate
all consumer complaints for 2150 national banks... from a single
customer assistance center."' 37  Moreover, the Committee expressed
concerns of whether the OCC's possession of exclusive authority in
regards to "consumer law enforcement activities that typically have
been undertaken by the States... could weaken the OCC's ability to
carry out its most primary mission of ensuring safety and soundness of
the national bank system.'
138
In response to such arguments, the OCC issued a series of letters
in 2004 asserting that states' citizens are not in any heightened amount
of danger as a result of the new OCC preemption regulations. 3 9 The
OCC stressed that states' citizens are not any more vulnerable to
predatory lending practices when national banks are subject to federal
regulation than the citizens would be if state law governed national
banks and their operating subsidiaries. 40 OCC Letter 999, for example,
emphasizes that national banks, like state banks, are subject to unfair
and deceptive acts and practices regulation. 141
134. Id. at 353.
135. Id. at 355.
136. Id. at 352.
137. Id at 352 (citing H. FIN. SERV. COMM., 108TH CONG., 2D SESS., VIEW AND
ESTIMATEs OF THE COMM. ON FIN SERV. ON MATTERS TO BE SET FORTH IN THE CONCURRENT
RES. ON THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR FOR 2005, (Comm. Print, Feb. 25, 2004)).
138. Wilmarth, supra note 125, at 352.
139. See OCC Further Clarifies Lending Preemption Regulation, 8 FIN. SERVICES ALERT
2 (Aug. 31, 2004) (indicating that the OCC has responded to complaints through Letter 998
and describing the nature of Letters 998 and 999).
140. See id.
141. See id. (explaining that national banks must abide by Federal Trade Commission
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In addition, OCC Letter 998 pointed out that federal law does
not always preempt state law with respect to national banks and their
operating subsidiaries. 4 2  This Letter "confirm[ed] that state anti-
discrimination laws are not preempted across the board by the
Preemption Regulation, but rather would be considered as to
preemption on a case-by-case basis."'
143
Critics of the recent preemption regulations, however, are not
satisfied with the OCC's letters.1" Neil Milner, President and CEO of
the CSBS noted that the OCC "acted unilaterally and with disregard for
repeated requests from the Congress to allow federal lawmakers time to
debate and deliberate on the issues.' ' 145 Milner made this statement in
response to amendments the OCC made to its preemption regulations
without a public hearing on February 12, 2004.146 Additionally, CSBS's
Arthur Wilmarth warns, "Unless the OCC's position is overturned, the
frequency and effectiveness of government enforcement measures will
undoubtedly decline with regard to national banks and their
subsidiaries.'
' 47
B. INVASION INTO STATE SOVEREIGNTY
In his brief submitted amici curiae to the Second Circuit, Iowa's
assistant attorney general William Brauch argued that the OCC's
adoption of section 7.4006 was unauthorized due to its invasion into
"sovereign state interests protected by the Tenth Amendment, because it
attempts to transform state-chartered corporations into creatures of
federal law without the chartering states' permission.'
48 Brauch cited
142. See id.
143. Id. (indicating that the OCC has responded to complaints through Letter 998 and
describing the nature of Letters 998 and 999).
144. See infra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
145. CSBS Feb. 12, 2004 Press Release, supra note 28.
146. OCC Bulletin, Preemption and Visitorial Powers, available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/bulletin/200
4 -6 .doc. (explaining the amendments that clarified
the OCC's position on preemption) ("[s]tate authorities may not inspect, superintend, direct,
regulate, or compel compliance by a national bank with respect to any law regarding the
content or conduct of activities authorized for national banks, except as permitted under
federal law.").
147. Wilmarth, supra note 125, at 348.
148. Brief for Iowa Assistant Attorney General as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner-
Appellant at 28, Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305 (2005) (No. 04-3770).
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Hopkins Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Cleary, as support. 149
In Cleary, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a federal statute for
violating the Tenth Amendment where it permitted state-chartered
corporations to convert to federal charters without states' permission. 5 °
The court stated that "[formation, maintenance, supervision, and
dissolution of state-chartered corporations] are matters of governmental
policy, [therefore] it would be an intrusion for another government to
regulate by statute or decision."15'
A literal application of this rule to the Burke case would seem to
render section 7.4006 a violation of the Tenth Amendment because it in
effect determines how operating subsidiaries (state-chartered
corporations) shall be maintained and supervised. 5 2 Interestingly, the
Burke Court did not address this issue raised by the Commissioner. 15 3
Rather, it ruled in strict accordance with the wording of the OCC
regulation, and in effect gave much deference to the OCC and its ability
to adopt regulations under the authority granted to it by statute. 5 4 The
Court overlooked this constitutional argument'55 when analyzing both
Congressional intent and the reasonableness of section 7.4006.156
However, one factor that may have contributed to this omission
is the method by which the court approached the question. 5 7
Essentially, Burke simply applied the wording of the applicable law to
the facts of the case using the Chevron doctrine, a framework
established and repeatedly approved by the Supreme Court. 58
149. Id.; Hopkins Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 315 (1935) (ruling that
a statute allowing state-chartered institutions to convert to federal charters without the
state's permission violated the Tenth Amendment).
150. 296 U.S. 315 (1935).
151. Id. at337.
152. See Burke, 414 F.3d 305 (2005); 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 (2005) ("Unless otherwise
provided by Federal law or OCC regulation, State laws apply to national bank operating
subsidiaries to the same extent that those laws apply to the parent national bank.").
153. See generally Burke, 414 F.3d 305.
154. Seeid. at312.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 128-29.
156. See CSBS Feb. 12, 2004 Press Release, supra note 28 (indicating that current
preemptive regulations made by the OCC are outside of the scope of the OCC's authority
granted by statute, and therefore not reasonable).
157. See infra notes 159-173 and accompanying text.
158. See NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251,
257-58 (1995) (applying the Chevron doctrine and upholding the Comptroller of Currency's
broad decision-making power); see also Wells Fargo Bank of Tex., N.A. v. James, 321 F.3d




The Chevron framework itself has also endured some criticism
due to the result it yielded in Burke.159 CSBS President Neil Milner
complained, "The [Burke] decision shows, once again, how the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency has been allowed by the courts to
use the Chevron doctrine as a weapon against the states- in effect, as
an administrative bootstrap that permits the OCC to use Congressional
silence to justify its self-created preemption of 
state law.' ' 60
It may be argued, furthermore, that the Burke court should not
even have deferred to Chevron for the resolution of this case.
1 61 In Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corp. of
Engineers,162 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an agency's
interpretation of a federal statute because it in effect "permit[ed] federal
encroachment upon traditional state power" absent any "indication that
Congress intended that result.' 63 Moreover, the Court added:
Where an administrative interpretation of a statute
invokes the outer limits of Congress' power, we expect a
clear indication that Congress intended that result. This
requirement stems from our prudential desire not to
needlessly reach constitutional issues and our
assumption that Congress does not casually authorize
administrative agencies to interpret a statute to push the
limit of congressional authority. This concern is
heightened where the administrative interpretation alters
the federal-state framework by permitting federal
encroachment upon a traditional state power.'64
§ 7.4002, the OCC operated within the sphere delegated it by Congress).
159. See CSBS May 28, 2004 Press Release, supra note 127.
160. See id.
161. See Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corp. of
Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 172-73 (2001) (explaining why the Supreme Court sided with
states' rights over administrative deference by denying an agency's interpretation of a
federal law where the interpretation worked to usurp state authority).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.; see also Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 221 (1997) (demonstrating that
banking is a traditional state activity).
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Despite the constitutional questions raised by section 7.4006, however,
the Burke Court did not require a "clear indication that Congress
intended" federal law to preempt state law with respect to national bank
operating subsidiaries. Instead, the Second Circuit held that the district
court correctly applied the Chevron doctrine, which ultimately led to
broad deference to section 7.4006.65
Not all cases concerning whether or not a federal law preempts a
state statute require Chevron deference.1 66  Moreover, in instances
where a court does not apply the Chevron framework to a preemption
question, there is a greater chance that the state law will not be
preempted. 67 In Bankwest, Inc. v. Baker, for example, the Eleventh
Circuit ruled that a Georgia Act, which regulated agreements between
instate payday stores and out-of-state banks, was not preempted by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA). 168 Baker was initiated by a
series of out-of-state banks and payday loan corporations that were
seeking an injunction against the enforcement of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-17-1
to 16-17-10 (Georgia Act). The court declined to apply the Chevron
doctrine, and likewise ruled that federal law did not preempt the
Georgia Act. 1
69
However, there is a significant difference between the
circumstances in Baker and those in Burke. Baker did not involve
conflict preemption. 170 In other words, compliance with both state and
federal laws in Baker was not impossible, and the state law at issue
likewise did not stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. 171
Nevertheless, the plaintiffs in Baker did not want the Georgia Act to
apply. 72  In its decision, the court noted, "Because 'a preemption
determination involves matters... more within the expertise of the
165. Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F. 3d, 305, 315 (2d Cir. 2005).
166. See Bankwest, Inc. v. Baker, 411 F. 3d 1289, 1300 (1 1th Cir. 2005) (ruling that a
state statute was not preempted by a federal statute, deciding not to apply Chevron).
167. See generally id.
168. Id.; see also Elizabeth Willoughby, Bankwest v. Baker: Is it a Mayday for Payday
Lenders in Rent-a-Charter Arrangements?, 9 N.C. BANKING INST. 269, 281 (2005).
169. Baker, 411 F.3d,. at 1300.
170. See id.
171. See Fid. Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)
(describing what is meant by "irreconcilable conflict").
172. Baker, 411 F.3d at 1299.
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courts than within the expertise of an administrative agency, we need
not defer to an agency's opinion regarding preemption.
173
V. CONCLUSION
In Burke, the Second Circuit took a stance on the controversial
issue of preemption, establishing its position in the ongoing national
debate. The importance of the decision is unquestionable.
7 4  If the
court had ruled for the Commissioner, future courts would be faced with
ruling opposite a federal circuit's precedent if in favor of preemption for
operating subsidiaries.
There are arguments that Burke results in bad policy and was
decided incorrectly due to its deference to an invalid regulation.'
75
Many believe that the practical effect of Burke is to essentially make
states' citizens more vulnerable to improper practices by national banks
and their operating subsidiaries.1 76 Another argument is that the OCC
preemption regulations are unreasonable and should have therefore
failed the second prong of the Chevron analysis.
177  It may also be
argued that either the Second Circuit should not have applied Chevron
in this case, or that the Chevron doctrine itself provides a standard that
is too lenient for federal agencies to meet when enacting 
law. 178
Nonetheless, the effects of Burke are already noticeable in
courts throughout the nation. 179 Yet, the potential effect of the decision,
coupled with the OCC's expansive preemption policies, may be much
greater. Burke dealt with national banks' use of operating subsidiaries
173. Id. at 1301 (citing Colo. Pub. Utilities Comm'n v. Harmon, 951 F.2d 1571, 1579
(10th Cir. 1991)).
174. See supra notes 96-117 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 118-73 and accompanying text.
176. See CSBS Jan. 8, 2004 Press Release, supra note 126; see also CSBS Feb. 12, 2004
Press Release, supra note 28 (explaining the CSBS's reaction to the OCC's preemption
regulations).
177. See supra notes 127-158 and accompanying text.
178. See CSBS May 28, 2004 Press Release, supra note 127 (demonstrating the CSBS's
criticism of the Chevron doctrine).
179. See Wells Fargo Bank v. Boutris, 419 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining why the
Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's ruling that the Commissioner could not enforce
CRMLA or the CFLL against WFHMI because federal regulations preempt state
regulations with respect to national bank operating subsidiaries); see also Zindler, supra
note 97 ("The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in San Francisco upheld a lower
court's ruling that California regulators' attempt to require a Wells Fargo & Co. subsidiary
to hold a state license to offer mortgages was not legal.").
2006]
132 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 10
in the broad arena of mortgage lending.180 Therefore, its relevance with
respect to this aspect of banking law is immediate. It remains to be
seen, however, whether national banks will utilize Burke and current
OCC policy to expand their use of operating subsidiaries into other
contexts as well.
RUSSELL J. ANDREW
180. See Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2005).
